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The Evolution of the German Corporate Network
(1896-1933)
Karoline Krenn and Paul Windolf
University of Trier (Germany)
ABSTRACT
This article provides a structural analysis of corporate interlocks in Germany at the beginning of the 20th 
century. The main goal is, first, to point out that dense interlocking goes along with a socio-economic 
concentration process originating in the German Empire, and is "freezing" as a proved institutional solution 
during the Weimar Republic (Abelshauser, 2005; Streeck et al., 2001). Second, a special contribution is to 
highlight the mechanism behind the network evolution: multiple interlocking of "preferred" actors, thus, creating 
a core-periphery structured network. Reconstruction of social forces behind these patterns provides an insight 
into the diverse opportunity structure gained by core corporations. Results demonstrate that the German variety 
of economic modernization was not only a macro-phenomenon as aggregation would indicate. Actors were quite 
differently guided by these macro signals. The specific structure of German interlocks is due to selection 
processes at the micro-level which finally created a hegemonic network different than expected. 
Keywords
Corporate network, economic history, path dependency, social capital
I
NTRODUCTION
This paper is dealing with the formation of personal interlocks between stock companies from 1896 to 1933. 
Interlocks belong next to the concentration of ownership and a corporative system of industrial relations to the 
main features of the German variety of capitalism. Recent studies (Krenn, 2008b; Windolf, 2002; Windolf, 
2006;) on the comparison of corporate networks between Germany and the US revealed a set of persisting 
characteristics: German networks are more dense, centralized to the big financial and industrial enterprises and 
they have a strong tendency towards elite networks. Our research question is to see if dense interlocking is 
accompanied by a hegemonic figuration. Do we observe a strongly tied core? And what kind of social capital can 
be deduced from that?
After some comments on the empirical database we briefly discuss theoretical assumptions and methods applied 
in the paper. Further on here we will mainly follow two aims: Our first goal is to show the concentration of 
corporate interlocks during the 1920s. The second aim is to reveal characteristic structural mechanisms and 
determinants behind the observed formation process.
DATABASE
The data shown is part of result of research funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Corporations 
were selected by a size criterion (minimum amount of stock capital in 1896: 5 million Reichsmark (RM), for all 
other years 10 million RM). In the next step data which involved beside information on managing directors 
(CEOs) and board members also individual attributes of firms (e.g. sector) was collected for selected companies 
from year books on stock corporations (see table notes). Germany has a two-board system by which executive 
managing organs (= CEOs) are personally split from controlling organs (= board of directors).
Corporations who share at least one director are considered as connected. Corporations which have no director 
with any other corporation in common are regarded as isolates. Accounting for the German board system 
interlocks can be divided into 'undirected' board-to-board interlocks and 'directed' CEO-to-board interlocks. 
Theoretically this difference will be strengthened in order to attribute a stronger influence opportunity to directed 
relations (see the following section). Table 1 gives an overview on the database. 
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Year Corporations Positions
in Corporations
Connected 
Corporations
Isolates
1896 212 1665 156 56
1914 346 4112 321 25
1928 377 8169 366 11
1933 405 6303 389 16
Table 1: Number of Observations (N)
Source: Hoppenstedt, 1896, 1914, 1928, 1934.
Number of corporations as well as number of positions (board sizes) in both managing and controlling boards 
increased from 1896 to 1933. This paper is mainly dealing with German interlocks. In certain instances though, 
data is compared to US interlocks. US companies were likewise selected by size. Sources were equivalent year 
books (NN, 1900/01a; 1900/01b; 1901; 1914/15a; 1914/15b; 1915; 1928; 1928/29a; 1928/29b).1
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Some remarks on the theoretical background of this research seem to be necessary. A key concept to describe the 
bond between economy and society is the notion of institutional embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Polanyi, 
1944). For a majority of sociologists institutions are the central units for explaining social order (North, 1990). 
That's because, and thereby we are aware of reanimating an old truism, contingency is as a main distinguishing 
feature of the social world. Consequently, the outcome of social interactions is underdetermined which causes
uncertainty. In most circumstances this turns out to be problematic.  Arising “problems” are solved by selecting 
standard solutions, that is to say, institutions. In order to avoid the functionalist trap, it’s important to bear in 
mind that existing institutions are only undetermined selections out of an unknown number of possible others 
(Luhmann, 1991). In this regard studying the evolution of social structures gives important insights into the ways 
in which "history matters”: Past selections confine future choices. In a simplified way that’s what’s meant by 
path-dependence (see e.g. Thelen, 2003). Looking at social structures of a certain period the institutional choices 
of the past are among the key explanatory factors. Now, taking into consideration that economic institutions are 
embedded in a broader frame of societal norms and regulations it's conclusive that those institutions are 
influenced and mutually shaped by other pre-existing institutions, too. 
Current comparative analyses of corporate governance structures basically identify two types of market 
economies, ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ ones (for a detailed discussion on varieties of capitalism see Hall et al., 
2001 and Lehmbruch, 2001). They differ in their extent of market regulation. The German model definitely 
belongs to the type of coordinated market economies. Its characteristics are boiling down to one central theme: 
the regulation of competition. That is reflected in all sub spheres of the economy (e.g. concentration of corporate 
ownership, interlocking directorates and strong workholder participation, see Beyer, 2006; Streeck et al., 2003). 
According to historians the formation of those specific economic institutions started mainly during the period of 
the German Empire and, is still lining a trajectory till present (Abelshauser, 2005). 
The emphasis of the paper is set on the corporate network. In Germany interlocking directorates have become a 
national institution for long. From a macro perspective this interlocking has been taken as indicator for a high 
extent of integration of the economy (see above). It's now a specific achievement of the network approach to 
provide a tool for measuring social structures on the aggregate as well as on the individual level. Individually 
oriented network theories explain interlocks from a resource dependence resp. control perspective. Thereby, the
number of relations of one actor to another is a measure for his social capital (Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1990). 
1 The following table gives an overview on the US database.which has slightly different time points: 1900 instead of 1896 and 1938 instead 
of 1933. For a detailed analysis on the US case we refer to Windolf (Windolf, 2006).
Year Corporations Positions
in Corporations
Connected 
Corporations
Isolates
1900 249 3317 226 23
1914 242 3495 193 49
1928 369 6459 329 40
1938 409 6766 375 34
Table 1 in footnoteError! Main Document Only.: Number of Observations of US Firms (N)
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The more relevant relations one actor has, the more resources he controls, but also the more socially constrained 
he is. Interlocking in this sense not only provides an opportunity structure for the exchange of all different sorts
of information but also other resources as e.g. the building-up of trust relationships and, in case of directed CEO-
to-board ties, the influence and control of one actor over another (Koenig et al., 1979; Mizruchi, 1996). 
Especially the later gained particular attention in connection with the role of big financial institutions. There’s a 
long theoretical tradition following the assumption that the most relevant resource for corporations is capital.
Subsequently, banks are regarded as more powerful actors than any other (Hilferding, 1910). Financial control 
resp. hegemony models therefore argue that banks institutionalize their influence opportunities through 
interlocks. No matter what motive finally turns the balance, directed ties are at any rate intentional interlocks.
HYPOTHESES
When looking at corporate interlocks in Germany before 1933 we have two assumptions. On the institutional 
level we expect an increase in network density paralleling the concentration process in the surrounding economic 
institutions (path dependence hypothesis). After an already very supportive law tradition during the German 
Empire, especially, law regulations for corporate ownership during the Weimar Republic facilitated corporate 
group structures. The key period for the concentration process are the 1920s. That’s when we expect a 
proliferation of interlocks, too.
On the individual level we assume a non-random distribution of ties providing a subgroup of preferred actors 
with a substantial amount of social capital (social capital hypotheses). Essential economic resources are capital, 
commodities and energy. Corporations offering these resources are expected to be in the centre of the network. 
Further on, we expect a hegemonic figuration of central actors "referring" back to themselves.. 
METHODS
For analysing the cohesion at the aggregate level we will be looking at the change of density of interlocks. Doing 
this we regard the relations between connected corporations. Density is defined as the proportion of realised to 
all possible relations (Wasserman et al., 1999). In this case we simply look at single relations between 
corporations, multiple relations are being neglected. A value close to zero means very little interlocking whereas 
a value close to the maximum, one (or 100%), is a sign that nearly every actor is connected to every other. 
Regarding the network density only may lead to underestimation of cohesion in large networks (Festinger et al., 
1950). Therefore, Friedkin measures (Friedkin, 1981) are applied to obtain full complexity of the network 
cohesion. When comparing networks of different size Friedkin suggests looking at five structural attributes. 
Reachability gives the proportion of mutually connected actors, geodesic is the average shortest path between 
two arbitrary actors, diameter is the longest shortest path, and finally the number of triads in the network and the 
proportion of actors who don't belong to any triad. 
The number of ties (defined as degree) is a common centrality index for individual actors (Wasserman/Faust, 
1999). To point out differences between the corporations degree distributions are compared. Further on, the 
centrality measure will be generalized to the group level by looking at core-periphery structures (Everett et al., 
2005). Core-periphery models are assuming a star alike distribution of ties over the network. In an ideal structure
ties centre to a core with high density within, low density between the core and an outer periphery and, hardly 
any ties within the periphery. The fit of the model is tested by an algorithm correlating the permuted data matrix 
and the ideal structure matrix (Borgatti et al., 1999).
Stochastic analysis allows us to examine how social capital is distributed by the network. For testing the 
probabability to observe the given structure we are using exponential random graph (ERG) models based on a 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo procedure (see Frank et al., 1986; Pattison et al., 1999; Robins et al., 2007; 
Wasserman et al., 1996. This is a stochastic process creating a random graph with same network size as our 
observed network. Then, observed and randomized patterns are tested against each other. Thereby, the 
distinguishing structural attributes of the network (compared to the core) are identified. 
Explanations for the core-periphery structure are further analysed by regression analyses.  Depend variable is the 
core affiliation. Independent variables are the industrial affiliation (by sector), size of the corporation in total 
balance sheets and the board size (number of CEOS/number of directors on board/number of banks on board of 
directors). We chose logit regressions for categorical dependent variables (Agresti, 2002).
Software packages used are UCINET, R, PNET and STATA.
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RESULTS
Figure 1 compares single relation interlocks of stock companies between Germany and the US at four time 
points (1896 to 1933). The density of personal interlocks between corporations is in absolute terms not extremely 
high.  It shows that interlocking patterns are in both countries quite similar till 1914. Specific for the German 
network is a continuous increase of board-to-board relations till 1928. Subsequently, in 1928 the gap in network 
density is already pronounced. Whereas in the US interlocks between corporations become less likely we are 
observing a radical proliferation of ties in Germany. By 1933 there is again a decrease in density. This is mainly 
due to a legal restriction limiting the board size radically.
Moreover, figure 1 shows that in Germany undirected board-to-board relations are much denser than CEO-to-
board relations.  That is to say, corporations are more likely to be connected by their boards than by their CEOs.
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Figure 1: Single Interlocks between Stock Companies in Germany and the US (density in %)
In addition, Friedkin measures give a broader view on network cohesion. Table 2 sums up the results. As we see 
till 1928 the network gets more connective, path distances between actors decrease, actors are more and more 
present in cohesive subgroups as triads - even in spite of a boost in network size. 
1896
(N=156)
1914
(N=321)
1928
(N=365)
1933
(N=388)
Connectivity 72.8 % 96.3 % 100 % 100 %
Average Geodesic 3.5 2.7 2.1 2.3
Diameter 9.0 7.0 4.0 5.0
Actors not involved 
in triads* %
31.4 % 13.1 % 2.2 % 4.4 %
Average number of 
triads*
7.65 114.65 680.93 254.25
Density 3.4% 5.5% 11.8% 7.6%
* Calculated on the basis of all single relations independent of direction.
Table 2: Network Cohesion (Friedkin Measures)
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Looking at cohesion measures we come to the conclusion that the aggregation of personal interlocks between 
large stock companies is mainly due to processes taking place between 1913 and 1928. Apart from increase in 
density we observe a fully connected network, short average path distances, a high number of triads and high 
proportion of actors involved in triads. That confirms our first hypothesis. After the destabilization caused by 
World War I and the following inflation period the German path logic which encourages the regulation of
competition is freezing in the main economic sub spheres. In the US the situation is completely another. 
Differences in governance traditions give profound explanation for this phenomenon. Central for Germany is the 
high concentration of corporate ownership in the hand of corporations, personal interlocks have clear incentives 
as they often go along with capital interlocks (Windolf/Beyer 1995). One could argue that an increase in 
interlocking is not a big surprise, then, if parent companies staff the board of their (newly acquired) subsidiaries 
with own directors. And clearly there a several good examples for that amongst which the merger of leading 
steel and mining companies to the 'Vereinigten Stahlwerke' in 1926 is most prominent. This specific arrangement 
was considered and discussed by the leading economic figures as August Thyssen und Hugo Stinnes over more 
than two decades. In the course of the merger the new and extremely large parent corporation became a key actor 
in the network. So what is interesting about these results? Dispatching of directors to boards of other 
corporations leads to an increase in directed interlocks. And, yes, indeed, there's a remarkable increase of CEO-
to-board relations from 1913 to 1928, e.g. between those corporation forming the 'Vereinigten Stahlwerke'. 
Nevertheless, even in 1928 directed relations only make 11 percent out of more than 12.000 interlocks. The vast 
majority of increase in interlocking is due to board-to-board relations. Table 3 gives totals for all four time 
points. 
Board-
Board
Board-
Board 
(dichot.)
multiple* CEO-
Board
CEO-
Board
(dichot.)
multiple* reciprocal° Connected
Corporations
(N)
1896 377 313 17.% 136 129 5.1% 1% 156
1914 3219 2530 21.4% 543 497 8.5% 1.5% 321
1928 10862 7344 32.4% 1385 1182 14.7% 6.1% 365
1933 6924 5177 25.2% 1219 1026 15.8% 5% 388
* Proportion of multiple relations in total 
° Reciprocity is calculated for directed (CEO-Board) relations only. 
Table 3: Observed Interlocks 1896-1933
Apart from an overall proliferation in interlocks the main characteristic of the observed network is the increase in 
"strong ties" (Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 1997). We observe a growth of multiple relations in undirected as well as 
directed board relations. Strong ties like these are not only a sign for an overall concentration process but 
indicating an opportunity structure for the exchange of valuable information and trust. Directed ties are less 
likely to observe than undirected ties, nevertheless, they double from 1914 to 1928. From 1928 on also mutual 
CEO-to-board relations become more common. Thus, the opportunity structure for mutual control increases.
With regard to the distribution of ties Gini-coefficients vary between 1896 and 1933 from 0.46 to 0.53 which is 
indicating a rather high inequality. Looking at the tie distribution by histograms (here exemplary for 1928) it 
shows that most corporations have just a few ties to others whereas a small group of corporations gathers the 
majority of ties (concerning the Matthew effect we refer to Merton, 1968). This is true for undirected relations 
(figure in the left) and even more for directed relations (figure in the right). 
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Figure 2: Degree Distribution 1928
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A main structural explanation for the inequality in degree distribution is the existence of two complementary 
regions in the network. By looking at regional differences the centrality concept is generalized to the group level 
(Everett et al., 2005). Pointing to the network size we assume a core-periphery structure. 
When looking at single and multiple relations altogether the observed patterns fit a core-periphery structure. A 
rather small core (fluctuating between 14% and 19% of all corporations) concentrates most interlocks on itself (s. 
table 4). E.g. in 1928 the 68 core corporations have more ties than the periphery (297 corporations) altogether 
and an average number of 185 ties. 
1896
(N=156)
1914
(N=321)
1928
(N=365)
1933
(N=388)
Core 182 /18.2
(N=10)
3507/81.6
(N=43)
12564/184.8
(N=68)
7215/109.3
(N=66)
Periphery 836/5.7
(N=146)
3981/14.3
(N=278)
11762/39.6
(N=297)
8941/27.8
(N=322)
Note: In this case we are looking at ties. Every interlock is counted for each corporation. This leads to double counting. In order to avoid 
double-counting of core-periphery interlocks themselves total shares may not be calculated.
Table 4: Core-Periphery Structure by Ties (Sum /Average)
Moreover the density within the core is much higher than between core and periphery, resp. within the periphery 
(s. table 5). 
1896 1914 1928 1933
C
(N=10)
P
(N=146)
C
(N=43)
P
(N=278)
C
(N=68)
P
(N=297)
C
(N=66)
P
(N=322)
Core 1,489 0,033 1,082 0,130 1,680 0,243 0,942 0,149
Periphery 0,033 0,037 0,130 0,032 0,243 0,078 0,149 0,056
Table 5: Core-Periphery Structure by Density (sum of relations)
In addition, the core-periphery structure is mostly due to multiple relations. Looking at single relations only the 
differences in density are much lower (s. table 6). That leads to the conclusion that the core nourishes itself from 
multiple, therefore, rather strong interlocks.
1896 1914 1928 1933
C
(N= 10)
P
(N=146)
C
(N=87)
P
(N=234)
C
(N=119)
P
(N=246)
C
(N=123)
P
(N=265)
Core 0,733 0,053 0,351 0,049 0,520 0,104 0,320 0,070
Periphery 0,053 0,028 0,049 0,019 0,104 0,037 0,070 0,029
Table 6: Core-Periphery Structure by Density (single relationsl)
Resuming results so far, the observed network is shaped by a minority of corporations with not only 
comparatively more but also multiple interlocks. These actors gain a high amount of social capital out of this 
network. There is reason to assume that the core chooses preferably back to itself. Multiple ties prove the 
strength of relations. But what do we know about reciprocal ties? From what we see we would expect much 
reciprocity within the core.
Reciprocity is a universal characteristic of social relations. It can only be traced for ties with “directions”, in our 
case, CEO-to-board relations. The other social force analysed here is preferential attachment (Barabasi et al., 
1999). For directed ties the later has two different information. Expansiveness of an actor k is identified via a k-
out-star structure (much "sending"). Respectively, popularity of an actor is identified via k-in-star structure 
(much “receiving"). Both forces are modelling the Matthew effect in distribution of ties (Merton 1968). To 
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analyse the corresponding social forces behind the patterns of observed interlocks we proceed with random 
graph analysis.2 Accounting for the shortness of the paper, we focus on 1914 and 1928.
When comparing dyadic attributes to a random distribution in a network of same size and density we observe 
three main results.3. For two chosen time points there’s more reciprocity than expected. That's the strongest 
effect. With regard to preferential attachment, expansiveness and popularity are clearly forces driving the 
network. We observe a k-out star as well as a k-in star effect.
1914 1928
Full Network
 (N= 321)
Core
(N= 43)
Full Network
(N=365)
Core
(N= 68)
Effects obs. est. Parameter obs. est. Parameter obs. est. Parameter obs. est. Parameter
Reciprocity 18 2.85*
model 1
11 0.97* 83 2.7* 21 1.03*
K-out-Star 661 (2.17*)
model 2 199 2.57* 1752 2.27* 430 2.29*
K-in-Star 432 (0.99*)
model 2 138 0.66* 1385 1.02* 338 0.27*
* Significant at 0.01 level
Note: Parameter values infer that the corresponding configuration is present in the observed graph to a greater or lesser extent than expected 
by chance.
Table 7: ERG Estimation for CEO-to-Board Relations (final model with fixed density)
By checking forces driving the full network against the core we come to a surprising result. The reciprocity 
effect is distinctly smaller for the later. Reciprocity is less likely within the core than in the full network. As well 
as core interlocks are less likely to have a k-in-star structure than the network as a hole. Nevertheless, the core is 
quite expansive. Seeing both results together there’s reason to assume that CEOs of core corporations tend to 
span directed ties to the periphery. But what role does the core take with it? And what else do we know about 
core corporations?
Our final examination might suggest some possible answers. We close with regression analysis based on social 
capital assumptions. Actor attributes are tested as explanatory factors for core affiliation. Resource dependence 
theories suggest an influence by sector (model 1). Control variables are size of corporations (by balance sheet 
totals) and board sizes (model 2). Because of the prominence of finance control models we are not only looking 
at the banking sector but also including the personal level, the number of bankers on board of directors.
With respect to determinants for core affiliation models 1 show significant sector effects both for 1914 and 1928. 
Nevertheless, resource dependence has only little explanation value. However, the fit of the models is highly 
increasing taking control variables into account. Foremost, the size of board of directors (not CEOs, though) and 
the number of bankers on board are a key explanatory factor for core affiliation (models 2). 4
2 ERG modelling is still developing (problems: easily degenerating, only for single relations). Models only converged for 
directed CEO-to-board relations without attributes. For that reason the chosen focus is also a technical compromise.
3 With regard to triadic structures in the network the results didn't suggest any remarkable differences to random networks of 
the same size. Hence, observed social forces are rather of dyadic than triadic nature.
4 The size of the board and the number of bankers on board are most influential determinants for the degree distribution as 
well (concerning results we refer to Krenn, 2008a; Windolf, 2007).
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Core (yes/no)
1914 1928
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Sector ++
Banking 1.031** -2.163** 0.739* 0.020
Steel/Metal 1.086** 0.960 1.506*** 1.858***
Mining 0.951* 0.527 1.170*** 1.276**
Electric utilities 2.049*** 2.062** 0.562 0.354
Größe: 
Balance sheet total 
(in 100m. Reichsmark)
1.850 0.034
Directors (N):
CEOs
0.088 -0.003
Board Members 0.248*** 0.097***
Bankers on Board 1.093*** 0.838***
Interactioneffect
(Board*Bankers on Board)
-0.034 -0.013**
Constant -2.386*** -6.289*** -2.003*** -4.868***
Observations 283 283 361 361
Pseudo-R² 0.06 0.45 0.05 0.33
McFaddens R² 0.02 0.36 0.02 0.27
Nagelkerkes R² 0.09 0.55 0.07 0.44
df 4 9 4 9
LR chi2(df) 13.60 102.10 16.67 114.30
Prob > chi2 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.000
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
++ Category of reference: all other sectors
Table 8: Determinants for Core Affiliation in 1914 and 1928 (logit coefficients)
Remarkably, these models would suggest that the network position is independent from primary resources. The 
message is clear, co-optation strategies determine the amount of social capital gained by the network. But that’s 
not the whole story. Even, if economically important banks are not securing their core position as group, bankers
on board of directors provide corporations with essential links.
CONCLUSION
What does all this mean? To start with, the findings on the macro-level go well along with our hypotheses. The 
proliferation of interlocks in the 1920s proves the interpenetration of institutions down path dependent 
argumentation. The establishment of a dense network takes place in a time in which prior selections in law
traditions and social organisation already favour or facilitate continuity.
On the individual level however, results are trickier to interpret. Inequality in degree distribution is leading to a
core-periphery structure. Hence, the core consists of small group of corporations with diverse structural 
characteristics. It has strong but rather undirected interlocks within which can be traced back to “network 
sensitive” directors on boards. Further on, core corporations make use of intentional links by dispatching their 
CEOs. Especially, there’s a high chance for reciprocity between core and periphery. Resuming, core 
corporations have not only high but moreover quite diverse social capital at disposal. The information flow is 
secured by a large quantity of undirected interlocks, independently, control opportunities are guaranteed be 
direct links. 
We argued that core corporations are clearly the winner of this specific degree distribution. Nevertheless, this is 
not due to their hegemonic position which cannot be directly transformed into a power closure, but due to their 
most effective balance between weak and strong ties.
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